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Abstract 
A somewhat unique feature of the global climate negotiations is that most governments allow 
representatives of civil society organizations to be part of their national delegation. It remains 
unclear, however, why states grant this access in the first place. While there are likely to be 
benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from 
constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, the paper argues for a ‘contagion’ effect in 
order to explain this phenomenon. States, which are more central to the broader network of 
global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states’ actions 
and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil 
society actors if their counterparts do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the 
participation of civil society organizations in national delegations to global climate 
negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the 
paper also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the recent UNFCCC negotiations in 
Durban in 2011.  
 
Keywords: civil society; climate change; global governance; social network analysis 
 
 
 
 
Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the European Political Science Association, 
Barcelona, Spain, June 20-22, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgment 
We acknowledge financial support from the NCCR’s (National Center of Competence in 
Research) project on ‘Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century’ (http://www.nccr–
democracy.uzh.ch/).  
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2108643 
2 
 
Introduction 
Civil society organizations (CSOs)1 have become increasingly important in world politics 
over the past few decades. Academic interest in the drivers of this development has grown 
accordingly, with a strong focus on policy areas such as human rights and environmental 
politics where the involvement of CSOs is particularly pronounced (e.g., Weiss & Gordenker 
1996; Charnovitz 1997; Raustiala 1997; Clark et al. 1998; Scholte 2004; Betsill 2006; 
Bernauer & Betzold 2012; Bernauer et al. 2013). Much of this existing research on civil 
society in global governance concentrates on whether and how CSOs are able to influence 
international policy–making and its outcomes (e.g., Paterson 1996; Corell & Betsill 2001; 
Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004; Betsill & Corell 2001; 2008; Betsill 2006). However, one 
aspect of this issue has received rather little attention to date: why do governments frequently 
include CSOs formally in international policy–making?  
This question is fundamental because most scholars agree that states were and generally 
still are in control of international policy–making processes. Why, to what extent, and in what 
form could they be interested in relinquishing some control over policy–making? On the one 
hand, the overwhelming majority of global governance sectors, e.g., trade liberalization, 
monetary policy, banking regulation, or security policy efforts, is strictly intergovernmental 
(Thomann 2007). On the other hand, the participation of CSOs in international politics exists 
in a few areas,2 and in particular the policy–making process in global climate policy is 
characterized by the presence of numerous civil society observers and an impressive number 
of CSO representatives that are formally included in states’ negotiation delegations. For 
                                                             
1 Following Steffek & Nanz (2007: 28f; see also Castiglione 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998), we 
consider as civil society all those actors (groups) that pursue interests in global governance, but do not 
belong to or are affiliated with official governmental and/or state entities. This approach possibly 
employs the broadest definition by also including business associations or corporations (see also 
Biermann & Gupta 2011, 1856; Bernstein 2005: 148; Haas 1999: 103). 
2 For instance, one might think of the International Labor Office with its tripartite corporatist 
representation of government, business, and labor. As elaborated below, however, we focus on CSOs’ 
membership in states’ delegations at the global climate negotiations, which we define as formal 
participation.  
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example, during the 2011 round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, about the same number of civil society and government 
representatives participated; more than 70% of the 193 countries involved formally granted at 
least one CSO representative access to their national delegation; and about 18% of all 
members of national delegations were CSO representatives (see Böhmelt 2013).  
The formal inclusion of CSOs in national delegations generally offers greater opportunities 
for these actors to influence governmental decision–making (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; 
Raustiala 1997; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59; Steffek & Nanz 2007: 11; Thomann 
2007).3 This stems from the fact that CSOs are then not excluded from the unofficial sessions 
between governments, which are usually the decisive places for drafting conference 
declarations or treaties (Clark et al. 1998: 18). Hence, they actively participate in informal 
backdoor diplomacy, receive official state documents, and are able to present proposals 
(Raustiala 1997; Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004). Gulbrandsen & Andresen (2004: 73) 
conclude accordingly that CSOs are likely to ‘have the most far–reaching influence on […] 
negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collaboratively with key negotiators.’  
While it thus seems apparent why CSOs would welcome their inclusion in national 
delegations, it is more difficult to understand why governments may want to grant CSOs 
access in the first place.4 First and foremost, including CSOs is likely to constrain 
governmental autonomy or sovereignty, which we define as ‘the institutionalization of public 
                                                             
3 We do not imply that participating in state delegations is the exclusive avenue for exerting influence. 
We do also not state that access to delegations always and necessarily induces access to higher levels 
of decision–making. We claim, however, that it is one potential (and perhaps a sufficient) avenue for 
doing so. In consistence with that, Biermann & Gupta (2011: 1857ff) emphasize that the inclusion of 
civil society actors in international negotiations constitutes an important facet of those negotiations, 
while Gulbrandsen (2008) is particularly interested in the ‘privileged access’ of non–governmental 
actors (see also Sell & Prakash 2004: 151). 
4 Note that existent approaches such as the boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink 1998) ‘privilege the 
agency of NGOs and do not consider why states would sometimes institutionalize’ the relationship to 
civil society actors (Vabulas 2011: 1). That being said, considering also supply–side arguments would 
arguably provide a more comprehensive picture. However, this is beyond the scope of our paper and 
actually prevented due to data limitations. We will return to this issue in the conclusion. 
4 
 
authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains’ (Ruggie 1986: 143), in the sense 
that this cuts into the traditional prerogative of the nation–state to negotiate international 
agreements with other governments (Clark et al. 1998; Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004).5 
Consequently, states determine which non–governmental actors may participate and CSOs are 
often denied access to policy–making processes or are only allowed to participate as 
observers, i.e., they are not permitted to express their positions and participate in decision–
making during the negotiating process per se (Weiss & Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; 
Thomann 2007). 
In light of this, it is rather puzzling why governments formally include CSOs, since 
sovereignty is normally seen as one of the most valuable goods for states (see Biermann & 
Gupta 2011: 1856). Nonetheless, the literature highlights two motivations of governments to 
involve CSOs (Grant & Keohane 2005; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Böhmelt 2013; for an 
overview, see, e.g., Bernauer & Betzold 2012). First, states may expect to obtain useful 
information and expertise that they lack regarding the issue at hand (Raustiala 1997; see also 
Betsill & Corell 2001; 2008; Biermann & Pattberg 2008). The second motivation focuses on 
legitimacy: governments may opt for civil society participation as a means to mitigate the 
‘democracy deficit’ and/or to enhance the legitimacy of global governance (e.g., Bernstein 
2005; Grant & Keohane 2005; Betsill & Corell 2008; Steffek & Ferretti 2009; Biermann & 
Gupta 2011; Keohane 2011; Dryzek 2012). 
 In this paper, we focus on the legitimacy argument, which we combine with a social 
network perspective to explain variation in CSO inclusion in global climate governance. We 
argue that governments are a priori hesitant to formally include CSOs in international policy–
making processes. However, governments are embedded in broader networks of interstate 
                                                             
5 Governments may try and avoid this dilemma by including CSOs that share the same interests with 
them. But doing so is unlikely to have the desired legitimacy increasing effect and, hence, the dilemma 
remains. 
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relations. States more strongly embedded in these networks benefit from a higher flow of 
information therein, and they are then more likely to be influenced by the practices of other 
governments with respect to CSOs. We ultimately argue that states are more likely to 
formally include CSOs in order to avoid a potential legitimacy advantage of their counterparts 
and to enhance domestic legitimacy if the following two conditions apply: first, if they are 
more central to the global governance network and, second, if other states formally include 
CSOs as well. 
We test this hypothesis with data on formal CSO inclusion in national delegations to the 
UNFCCC negotiations between 1995 and 2005. Quantitative statistical analyses offer strong 
support for the hypothesized contagion effect. Additional evidence from a survey of 50 
national delegation representatives to the 2011 UNFCCC conference in Durban suggests that 
legitimacy considerations are likely to be one of the main causal mechanisms underlying the 
quantitative findings, although we also find evidence for states’ concerns over sovereignty. 
The academic and practical relevance of our research extends beyond the specific case of 
climate policy, in the sense that this work contributes to ‘identifying sources and mechanisms 
that can contribute to enhanced accountability and legitimacy of governance arrangements’ 
(Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1856; Kingsbury 2007; Mason 2008). 
 
Social networks, legitimacy, and civil society participation: Theoretical argument 
We develop our theoretical argument by first elaborating on social networks and how they 
may affect the evolution of shared norms and practices through information flows. We then 
discuss the reasons for why states may want to grant CSOs access to global governance 
efforts more thoroughly, with an emphasis on the legitimacy enhancing effects of such an 
involvement. In a third step, we connect the social network and civil society arguments to 
hypothesize that governments, which are more central to the global governance network, are 
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more likely to include civil society actors in response to other governments adopting this 
practice. 
 
Social networks: The role of ties and centrality 
In general, a social network is characterized by a set of actors and the relations between them 
(e.g., Borgatti et al. 2009; Hafner–Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2010; Bodin & Prell 2011; Ward 
et al. 2011). Actors can be individuals, groups of people, or states that are connected by 
specific types of relationships. Each kind of resource exchange is considered a network 
relation and actors experiencing such a relation are said to maintain a tie (or link). The 
strength of a tie may range from weak to strong, depending on the quantity, quality, or 
frequency of exchanges between actors. Patterns of who is tied to whom, and how, reveal the 
structure of the underlying network: they show how resources flow between actors and how 
these are interconnected in a network. Mutual memberships of two states in 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which will be of particular interest in this paper, 
provide one example for a tie linking two countries. These ties can be of direct or indirect 
nature. Direct links are connections that link two countries directly. States may also share 
indirect links, i.e., ties to one or more than one intermediary that connect two countries in the 
network. Direct and indirect links, therefore, connect a country to other states and determine 
the density, i.e., the cohesiveness of a social network as measured by the number and strength 
of links. 
Ties in social networks, both direct and indirect, facilitate the transmission of information 
about interests and intentions, and they tend to promote a common understanding (Dorussen 
& Ward 2008: 192f). Links that are shorter and denser enable actors to convey information at 
lower cost, with more precision, and faster. Denser social networks can thus help reduce 
uncertainty, increase trust, and facilitate the development of mutually accepted norms (Ward 
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2006: 151ff; Hafner–Burton & Montgomery 2006; Dorussen & Ward 2008: 194f; Hafner–
Burton et al. 2009: 569; Leifeld & Schneider 2012: 3; Ward & Cao 2012). In other words, 
interaction through network ties influences the behavior of actors by ‘endowing some with 
greater social power and by shaping common beliefs about behavior’ (Hafner–Burton & 
Montgomery 2006: 8). 
Against this background, Ward (2006: 151f) and others (e.g., Bodin & Prell 2011; for an 
overview, see Hafner–Burton et al. 2009) emphasize that countries with more numerous ties 
to other parties are extensively involved in relationships with the latter. This involvement 
makes states more central in a network. Greater network centrality increases opportunities for 
knowledge sharing and frequent encounters provide prospects for face–to–face contact that 
facilitate the diffusion of ideas, norms, and practices. In international politics, on which this 
paper focuses, IGO networks can thus form the basis for normative influence between states 
(Torfason & Ingram 2010). For example, von Stein (2008) finds that states’ level of centrality 
in the global IGO network has a positive effect on their participation in international climate 
agreements. The recent literature also shows that mutual IGO membership affects domestic 
policy choices, since connections in the network of IGOs can provide countries with 
information that fosters policy–learning and socialization (e.g., Cao 2009; 2010; Hafner–
Burton et al. 2008) 
 
Legitimacy promoting effects of formal civil society involvement 
As noted above, states should be generally unwilling to involve CSOs in global governance as 
this imposes constraints on government behavior (Clark 1995; Stasavage 2004). In the words 
of Clark et al. (1998: 29), ‘while governments have agreed to a certain level of NGO [civil 
society] involvement at the international level, they still bar NGO [civil society] participation 
in procedures or issues that in some way restrict state sovereignty.’ Such restrictions and 
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constraints are particularly pronounced if CSOs are formally included in delegations at 
international negotiations. Even if governments carefully select civil society representatives, 
giving CSOs a ‘seat at the table’ may result in considerable costs, since these use the 
improved opportunity for direct access to influence a state’s bargaining position in ways that 
could be undesirable from the government’s point of view. They may also openly voice 
dissent vis–à–vis the government’s position at the bargaining table and, hence, weaken a 
state’s negotiating position. Finally, the possibility exists that they leak confidential 
information to the press and the public.  
The literature highlights two potential reasons why states might be interested in formally 
involving CSOs in global governance efforts nevertheless. First, governments may expect to 
obtain useful information and expertise (Raustiala 1997; see also Betsill & Corell 2001; 2008; 
Biermann & Pattberg 2008). Raustiala (1997), for example, notes that civil society can help 
governments to obtain policy–relevant information at low cost, given the high level of 
uncertainty and complexity that characterizes environmental issues. However, recent research 
does not find support for the empirical implications of the information argument. For 
example, Böhmelt (2013) observes that civil society actors are more often included in 
delegations of countries with a higher bureaucratic quality, which ‘[…] are least in need of 
expertise and information provision.’ Others have challenged the knowledge argument on 
conceptual grounds: Bernauer & Betzold (2012: 64) argue that the ‘existing research offers 
episodic, but not systematic and strong empirical evidence that more civil society 
participation has contributed to more effective agreements.’ 
Second, governments may want to formally include CSOs due to concerns over legitimacy. 
Legitimacy commonly describes ‘the state or quality of being legitimate, i.e., of being in 
accord with established legal norms and requirements, or conforming to recognized principles 
or accepted rules and standards of behavior. Core elements of the concept of legitimacy are 
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the acceptance and justification of authority. Acceptance relates to the way in which rules or 
institutions are accepted by a community as being authoritative. Justification relates to the 
reasons that justify the authority of certain rules or institutions’ (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 
1858; see also Bernstein 2005; Keohane 2011).6 In the words of Lipset (1983: 64), 
‘legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.’  
Hence, states may opt for civil society participation as a means to enhance legitimacy of 
global governance at the international but also the national level (Bernauer & Betzold 2012: 
63; see also, e.g., Grant & Keohane 2005; Bernstein 2005; Betsill & Corell 2008; Steffek & 
Ferretti 2009; Biermann & Gupta 2011; Dryzek 2012). There is a widespread perception 
among electorates in many countries that international politics suffer from a lack of 
legitimacy and/or are characterized by a ‘democratic deficit’ (e.g., Nye 2001; Bernstein 2005; 
Steffek & Nanz 2007; Steffek & Ferreti 2009). Many observers of global governance thus call 
for ‘opening up the intergovernmental system to institutionalized balanced involvement of 
non–state actors’ (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1862). According to this logic, granting CSOs 
access to national delegations should improve political responsiveness, transparency, or 
(democratic) accountability, and ultimately legitimacy in the sense of international and 
domestic public support (Clark et al. 1998: 2; see also Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004: 59f; 
Grant & Keohane 2005; Steffek & Nanz 2007: 3; Steffek & Ferreti 2009; Dombrowski 2010; 
Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858; Bernauer & Betzold 2012).7  
                                                             
6 In this paper we concentrate on external legitimacy, i.e., the acceptance of a rule by non–members or 
non–participants (Biermann & Gupta 2011: 1858).  
7 In other words, we focus on legitimacy gains due to the formal inclusion of CSOs both at the 
international level, i.e., Putnam’s (1988: 436) first stage of the two–level game and his second stage 
that deals with domestic–level interests. In fact, CSOs are usually mass membership organizations. As 
representatives of voters, CSOs then shape public opinion and signal electoral (i.e., domestic) 
preferences to policymakers. Further, CSOs may signal voter preferences even in relatively closed 
negotiations through outsider strategies such as protests, demonstrations, or other types of direct action 
outside the negotiation forum. Therefore, the formal inclusion of CSOs in state delegations is not only 
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In fact, Hass (1999: 103) and Bernstein (2005: 148) explicitly state that non–governmental 
organizations can increase legitimacy of global policy–making via their inclusion in states’ 
negotiation delegations. Bernauer & Betzold (2012: 63) conclude that ‘more civil society 
participation will then, presumably, result in […] more legitimate global environmental 
agreements.’ For empirical evidence of the legitimizing force of civil society groups, Dellas 
(2011) and Schouten & Glasbergen (2011) demonstrate that civil society groups could 
enhance legitimacy via their participation in the decision–making processes of the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development or the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, 
respectively. Moreover, consider the following example of the Chinese delegation at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. According to 
Economy (2004: 126), the Chinese delegation was ‘embarrassed’ by its lack of civil society 
representation as compared to other countries and perceived this as a disadvantage in 
legitimacy and public support at the national and international level. This case also shows, 
however, that concerns over legitimacy alone may not necessarily be enough – the Chinese 
delegation became only aware of its ‘disadvantage’ when realizing what other states do.8 
 
Network centrality and civil society inclusion 
The existing evidence seems to favor the legitimacy argument and we thus focus on this 
incentive of states in the following for combining it with the network perspective. In short, we 
argue for a contagion effect to the extent that states, which are more central to the broader 
network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other 
states’ actions and policies toward civil society and may then react upon these.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
driven by countries’ interests to enhance legitimacy at the international but also the national level in 
order to increase the chances to ‘sell’ international agreements domestically. 
8 Note, however, that civil society and its formal inclusion in states’ negotiation delegations may not 
always or necessarily enhance legitimacy (e.g., Dryzek & Stevenson 2011). In the words of Bernauer 
& Betzold (2012: 64), ‘we simply do not (yet) know whether civil society participation can promote 
public support [legitimacy] for global environmental policies.’  
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More specifically, consensual knowledge, the evolvement of norms, and ultimately the 
degree of centrality in a network can shape actors’ behavior toward CSOs. If governments are 
well connected to other states, i.e., they experience a higher flow of communication in the 
overall state network due to a more central position, they are more aware of other countries’ 
position and preferences toward civil society. However, we do not claim that a more central 
position per se increases the likelihood that states formally include CSOs. Instead, while 
assuming that states generally do have concerns over legitimacy and accountability (Bierman 
& Gupta 2011; Bernauer & Betzold 2012), we argue that they might value these concerns 
higher than those about governmental autonomy and sovereignty if two conditions are met. 
First, other countries demonstrate a ‘positive behavior’ toward CSOs by, e.g., granting them 
formally access and, second, a state is aware of this. In other words, the likelihood of formally 
including CSOs in a national delegation depends on the degree of the respective country’s 
network centrality and the behavior of other governments vis–à–vis CSOs. Under those 
circumstances, states will be more likely to grant CSO representatives access if their 
counterparts do so as well in order to avoid potential legitimacy advantages of those 
counterparts and to enhance domestic legitimacy. This means that countries discount the loss 
of autonomy and put a higher value on legitimacy gains – however, only if other states do the 
same and if a state knows about this.  
For illustrative purposes, consider the decisions of countries i and j in this respect. If j 
decides to involve CSOs, i has a stronger incentive to do the same for two closely related, but 
distinct reasons. First, i learns that j came to the conclusion that the advantages of including 
CSO may outweigh the costs. This reduces uncertainty for i in respect to the costs and 
benefits of CSO inclusion and motivates inclusion of CSOs on the part of i. Second, CSO 
inclusion by j but not by i could become disadvantageous for i both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, CSOs in country i are likely to use CSO inclusion by j to urge 
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the former to involve CSOs as well. Internationally, i may also have to justify vis–à–vis j and 
other states why it is not involving CSOs. At either level, however, given the definition and 
importance of legitimacy above, j is likely to have a legitimacy advantage over i. Greater 
network centrality is important in this respect, since it leads to more information on 
government preferences and behavior traveling both ways: to the respective government, and 
from the latter to other governments. Hence, we formulate the main hypothesis as a contagion 
effect, i.e., states more central to the global governance network are more likely to formally 
include CSOs when other states do so. Conversely, states that are peripheral to the global 
governance network are unlikely to include CSOs even if other states in the network do so.  
 
Research design 
We first use a quantitative approach to examine whether the empirical evidence is consistent 
with the theoretical argument. This approach cannot, however, directly tell us whether 
legitimacy considerations and the tradeoff between sovereignty constraints and legitimacy 
gains are in fact the underlying driving force in governmental decisions on CSO involvement. 
To enhance confidence in our quantitative findings, we thus add insights from survey research 
conducted at the 17th Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the UNFCCC in Durban in 2011. 
 
Dependent variable and methodology 
With regard to the quantitative analyses, the dependent variable measures whether a country 
included at least one CSO representative in its national delegation to a given CoP to the 
UNFCCC (1) or not (0). These panel data cover the time period from 1995 to 2011 (Böhmelt 
2013). Consistent with the UNFCCC definition applied to participants in CoPs, our treatment 
of CSO representatives includes persons who are not employed or affiliated with a 
government/state or an inter–governmental organization but pursue interests in global climate 
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politics (see also Steffek & Nanz 2007). We merged these data on CSO inclusion to a data set 
whose unit of analysis is the directed country–dyad–year, e.g., the data include both the 
country–pair France–Brazil in 1998 and the country–pair Brazil–France in 1998. This data 
structure is necessary given the inherent directed logic of our theory: Brazil’s inclusion of 
CSOs could affect the probability of France also including CSOs – and vice versa. Because 
we lack data for most of our covariates after 2005, the combined data set covers the time 
period 1995–2005. The statistical analysis uses probit regression models, since the dependent 
variable is dichotomous. Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad to account for 
intra–group correlations or other forms of cross–section heterogeneity. The temporal 
dependencies are controlled by including a civil–society–years variable and different sets of 
cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998). This approach acknowledges that CSO inclusion might 
depend on corresponding choices in previous years. 
 
Main explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variables according to our argument are the behavior of other 
governments vis–à–vis CSOs and network centrality. With regard to the former, we use data 
on CSO inclusion by other countries as a proxy, taken from the same data source (Böhmelt 
2013) as used for the dependent variable – however, now focusing on a state’s counterpart in 
a dyad. To avoid potential problems with endogeneity, this variable Civil society – Dyadic 
counterpart is lagged by one year. 
For network centrality, we consider a country’s whole range and any strength of all ties to 
the entire IGO network (Hafner–Burton et al. 2009: 563f; Dorussen & Ward 2008; Freeman 
et al. 1991) and calculate it in terms of the reduction in total information flow in the network 
that would occur if a respective state did not exist. Put differently, we focus on the degree to 
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which the maximum flow between all unordered pairs of points depends on i and it is 
calculated by, 
Network centrality = 
 
j<k
m jk (xi)
n
∑
n
∑  
where i ≠ k ≠ j, and xi is a node in the network, i.e., the state of interest in a directed dyad; mjk 
is the maximum flow of information or the strength of ties from country xj to another country 
xk; consequently, mjk(xi) is the maximum flow of information from xj to xk that passes through 
country xi. It is calculated taking into account all actors of the network, i.e., all unordered 
pairs of states in the global governance network (see Freeman et al. 1991: 148). We use a 
standardized measure that ranges between 0 and 1 and follow Dorussen & Ward (2008) in 
operationalizing ties between states via common IGO memberships.  
The raw data for our network centrality variable were retrieved from Pevehouse et al. 
(2004). We then calculated the corresponding adjacency matrixes for each year in 1995–2005 
and estimated the respective values on the network centrality variable for each country and 
year in every directed dyad. This operationalization also has practical reasons, as most IGOs 
are weakly institutionalized (Dorussen & Ward 2008). Thus, in practice, we can ignore their 
(direct) influence as an intervening variable and an IGO then primarily serves as a vehicle that 
establishes ties between states through, e.g., the encounter of representatives in meetings and 
the working practices of the respective organization.  
To estimate the interactive impact of Civil society – Dyadic counterpart and Network 
centrality, we multiply the two variables and simultaneously include the new variable in the 
models. 
 
Control variables 
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The empirical models also include a range of covariates that help avoid omitted variable bias. 
Furthermore, considering alternative determinants of civil society inclusion also addresses 
possible selection effects, as only certain types of delegations are likely to consider the 
inclusion of CSOs. First, despite the lack of empirical support in previous research, we still 
control for the knowledge provision argument as discussed above by including an indicator 
for the quality of a country’s public administration. We use data from the Political Risk 
Services Group’s (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide (Howell 2011). Specifically, we 
include an indicator that is based on expert assessments and uses a 0–4 scale, with higher 
values signifying a higher bureaucratic quality in a country. 
Second, we also include the variable GDP per capita (ln). With a view to the 
environmental Kuznets curve literature (Seleden & Song 1994; Grossman & Krueger 1995), 
wealthier societies are more interested in forms of environmental protection focusing on 
measures other than the traditional ones that reduce local pollution. Climate policy may thus 
be more salient than in poorer countries (Mendelsohn et al. 2006). This, in turn, can motivate 
governments of richer countries to include CSOs. However, more developed countries tend to 
be less vulnerable to climatic changes, which may reduce the political saliency of the climate 
issue and the pressure for including CSOs. Because our theoretical focus lies elsewhere, we 
are agnostic about the net impact of such income effects, but control for them. The data are 
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.  
Third, democracies, relative to non–democracies, are more likely to provide environmental 
public goods at the national level and are more inclined to cooperate in international 
environmental problem–solving efforts as well (e.g., Congleton 1992; Ward 2008). We use 
Polity IV data to measure democracy (Marshall & Jaggers 2002), with the final variable 
ranging from –10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). 
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Fourth, the literature leads us to expect that pollution levels will fall with the power of 
green civil society groups (see Bernauer et al. 2013; see also Cao & Prakash 2012: 70; Ward 
& Cao 2012: 6). Hence, CSOs may have more political clout domestically if they are more 
numerous and this could also affect our dependent variable of interest. We control for this 
effect by adding the number of national environmental NGOs registered in each country using 
data from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (Bernauer et al. 2013).  
Finally, state delegations vary significantly in the number of involved delegation members. 
For example, the mean delegation size of the U.S. is about 71, while the Bahamas sent only 
two delegates to the CoPs on average. Since large countries are more likely to have larger 
delegations, we use the logged population size of a country to control for this. The data are 
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Similarly, ‘big and important’ countries 
might be more reluctant to accept constraints on their behavior that could result from CSO 
involvement. To account for this possibility, we include a dichotomous major power variable 
from the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1988).  
 
Empirical results 
Principle findings 
We use multivariate probit analysis to estimate three models. The first model concentrates on 
the main explanatory variables, while it excludes the control items except those for temporal 
aspects. The second model includes only the control covariates. The third model considers 
both explanatory and control variables. Instead of reporting the probit coefficients in a 
standard form, we present simulated first difference estimates (King et al. 2000). The first 
difference, in this context, equals the change in probability of a country including CSO 
representatives that results from a change on a respective explanatory variable from the 
minimum to the maximum value, while holding all other covariates at their median value. 
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__________________ 
Table 1 in here 
__________________ 
We start with the control variables in Models 2–3. Most controls have a substantial and 
statistically significant influence on the dependent variable. Countries with a higher income, 
more democratic states, and countries with a larger population are more likely to include 
CSOs in their national delegations. When moving from the minimum to the maximum of 
Democracy, for instance, the probability of a country including CSOs increases by 19.5%. 
Moreover, Major power and Domestic civil society negatively affect the probability of CSO 
inclusion. While the finding for the former variable is intuitively plausible, the latter might 
seem surprising. On average, the probability of CSO inclusion decreases by 17.5% as 
Domestic civil society grows from its minimum to its maximum value. One possible 
interpretation of this result relates to a ‘democracy–civil society paradox’ examined by 
Bernauer et al. (2013). These scholars argue that the marginal positive effect of civil society 
on international environmental cooperation decreases at high levels of democracy (see also 
Johnson & Prakash 2007). Finally, the insignificant effect of Bureaucratic quality is 
consistent with previous studies that were unable to find robust evidence for the information 
provision argument. 
With regard to the main explanatory variables and their interactive effect, note that we 
cannot interpret this directly (see Brambor et al. 2006). Thus, we computed the marginal 
effect of Civil society – Dyadic counterpart on our dependent variable along the values of 
Network centrality to allow for a substantive interpretation. Figure 1 depicts the results. 
__________________ 
Figure 1 in here 
__________________ 
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The likelihood of a state’s CSO inclusion increases by about 5–7% if a state is very central 
in the global governance network and if the other country in the dyad under study included 
CSO representatives in its national delegation before. This finding supports our theoretical 
argument on the contagion effect that countries include CSOs to enhance legitimacy. 
Conversely, the evidence also shows that countries that are peripheral to the global 
governance network are unlikely to include CSO representatives even if other countries in the 
network do. This finding is supported by the insignificant marginal effects of Civil society – 
Dyadic counterpart at low to moderate values of Network centrality. In the same vein, 
countries that are central to the network do not include CSOs if other countries do not include 
CSOs either. Put differently, even if a country is well connected in the network and, thus, is 
able to gain information regarding its counterparts’ intentions and preferences toward CSOs, 
these latter actors still have to include civil society actors in the first place. If they refrain 
from that, though, even a well–connected country will not consider civil society actors in its 
delegation, since it will be less concerned then about issues of legitimacy than issues of 
sovereignty and autonomy. Ultimately, and under those circumstances, it is unlikely that a 
state will invite civil society groups to its negotiation delegation. 
 
Survey results 
The statistical results show that states more central to the global governance network are more 
likely to include CSOs if other states do so in the first place. We argued that the underlying 
causal mechanism is that governments trade additional constraints imposed by CSO inclusion 
off against legitimacy gains. However, while this is in line with our findings, these results 
could also point to other mechanisms that cannot be captured with the quantitative 
methodology and it still remains to be answered empirically whether state actors that formally 
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include CSOs really perceive issues of and the tradeoff between sovereignty and legitimacy as 
important. 
Results of a survey we conducted with 50 government representatives from national 
delegations to the climate CoP in Durban in December 2011 provide additional support for 
the hypothesized causal mechanism underlying the statistical model results. As in all surveys 
of this kind, the sample is not entirely random and the respondents occupy differing functions 
at different levels of hierarchy in national delegations. However, the survey covers a wide 
range of countries that differ in many ways that are relevant for our purposes: for instance, in 
terms of income levels (e.g., Tajikistan, Bulgaria, Denmark), the political system (e.g., China, 
Pakistan, the USA), country size (e.g., Kiribati, Peru, China), geographic location (our sample 
includes several countries from each continent), and civil society inclusion in a delegation 
(e.g., Brazil, Libya, Germany).9 Moreover, 34 (68%) of the countries surveyed included CSO 
representatives in their respective delegation, whereas 16 (32%) did not. These shares 
correspond almost exactly to the observed patterns in our data set for the statistical analysis, 
which covers almost all countries in the UNFCCC process. Hence, we are confident that the 
responses obtained reflect the dominant views on CSO inclusion among the population of 
countries in global climate politics. Table 2 gives an overview of the survey’s sample. 
__________________ 
Table 2 in here 
__________________ 
Focusing on the responses from delegates whose delegation included CSO representatives, 
we obtain additional insights into governmental concerns about constraints and the perceived 
legitimacy benefits resulting from CSO inclusion. The results are summarized in Figure 2. 14 
delegates (42%) rated as important or very important that CSOs should be able to ‘speak on 
                                                             
9 The questionnaire and the survey data can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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behalf of the national delegation in the negotiations.’ However, 19 delegates (58%) responded 
that this function is rather unimportant or not important at all. Further, 26 delegates (81%) 
indicated that ‘to give interviews to the press on behalf of the government’ is not important or 
not important at all, while six delegates (19%) regarded this function as important or very 
important. Having said that, several respondents expressed concerns that CSO representatives, 
while performing these functions, might take a different position than the one agreed to before 
the CoP, adopt positions that are not in line with the government’s policies, reveal sensitive 
governmental positions, or act beyond their roles and responsibilities. This evidence supports 
the constraints part of our argument, which holds that governments trade constraints off 
against legitimacy gains associated with CSO inclusion. 
__________________ 
Figure 2 in here 
__________________ 
In terms of the legitimacy issue, more than three quarters of the surveyed government 
delegates whose national delegation includes CSO representatives (N=30; 88%) regarded as 
important or very important the function of CSO representatives to ‘observe the negotiations 
and report back to the public at home.’ Only four respondents (12%) regarded this function as 
not important or not important at all. A large majority of 27 government delegates (79%) 
agreed or strongly agreed that ‘the inclusion of civil society actors in the national delegations 
makes it easier for the government to convince citizens back home to support the 
government’s position.’ Only a small share of respondents (N=7; 21%) did not agree with this 
statement.10  
 
Conclusion 
                                                             
10 A question directly pertaining to the postulated contagion effect would further clarify the underlying 
issues. However, the original survey did not contain such a question. 
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In many areas of global governance, civil society participation reached spectacularly high 
levels. Predominantly in global climate politics, the empirical area our research focused on, 
around 70% of all national delegations included at least one CSO representative and 18% of 
all members of national delegations at the 2011 UNFCCC CoP were CSO representatives. 
This means that CSOs are present at a massive scale – not only as observers from the outside, 
but also formally included as negotiators on the inside. 
The theoretical argument developed in this paper focused on social networks and 
legitimacy in an effort to account for CSO inclusion in global governance. We argued that 
governments consider both constraints on government behavior and gains in legitimacy when 
deciding on whether to formally involve CSOs in their delegations or not. When trading these 
two aspects off, social networks – the network of global IGO memberships as in our case – 
are likely to play an important role in this respect. We claimed that – contingent on their 
extent of network centrality – governments are more likely to include CSO representatives if 
other countries do so. 
The quantitative analysis offers robust empirical support for this argument. Evidence from 
a survey conducted with 50 government representatives from national delegations to the 2011 
UNFCCC CoP in Durban lines up well with the underlying theoretical assumption that the 
contagion effect traveling through the global IGO network is driven by government 
considerations of legitimacy. This finding corresponds to the frequently made argument that 
civil society constitutes a ‘transmission belt’ between governments and their domestic 
citizenry (Steffek & Nanz 2007: 3). 
Further research could expand on the findings of our study in at least four ways. First, 
more detailed surveys of government representatives are needed to better understand the 
reasons why CSO representatives are included or not in national delegations. Such surveys 
should also identify variation across countries with respect to how autonomous included 
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CSOs are from the respective government, and what constraints are imposed on CSO 
representatives within delegations. It would also be interesting to find out whether including 
CSOs has the presumed legitimacy increasing effect on domestic audiences. If governments 
are including civil society to achieve legitimacy gains, and if they are taking well–informed 
decisions in this respect, we should observe that including CSO representatives makes 
domestic publics more accepting of procedural and perhaps even outcome aspects of global 
climate governance.  
Second, climate policy might be a rather exceptional case in terms of its level of CSO 
involvement and, thus, our study is unlikely to explain variance across domains, but rather 
applies to the issue of environmental and climate politics. However, although there is no 
systematic data that permit comparisons across global policy areas at this point, it might be an 
effort worth making to study other policy areas such as the security or trade domains based on 
our theoretical argument and empirical approach.  
Third, although we could clarify why states might be more likely to include CSOs in their 
delegation conditional on their level of connectedness to other states and how these treat civil 
society, it remains unclear why the latter grant CSOs access in the first place. We found 
support for the contagion effect, but there must be one country in the first place that makes the 
decision to formally include civil society in its delegation independent from other states. 
Finally, not all civil society groups are created equal and we might want to consider the 
relations among civil society groups and how they are networked as well. Risse–Kappen 
(1995), for instance, highlights the importance of internal characteristics such as resources, 
strategies, and leadership skills in relation to structural factors, e.g., domestic structures and 
transnational institutions, in influencing the policy impact of civil society groups (see also 
Sell and Prakash 2004: 169). In other words, it may be worth examining civil society 
organizations’ characteristics, their relations, and their networks more thoroughly than it was 
23 
 
possible in this study. Due to the current lack of data covering a broad set of actors and years 
on this, however, more data collection efforts seem necessary to address this issue more 
effectively (see, e.g., Bernhagen 2013: 36). 
In practical policy terms, our results suggest that those interested in increasing civil society 
involvement in global governance should try and motivate as many states as possible to 
include CSO representatives in their national delegations. This would facilitate the diffusion 
of CSO involvement to other countries. Obtaining observer status in global governance fora, 
which is what most CSOs focus on, hinges on collective inter–governmental decisions to 
grant access to CSOs. In contrast, each country is free to decide on its own how its national 
delegation is composed. Civil society involvement could thus be promoted quite effectively 
via unilateral national steps that have ripple effects through the global governance network. 
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Table 1. Probit regression models – Main results 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Civil society – Dyadic counterpart –0.024  –0.117 
 [–0.052; 0.008]  [–0.180; –0.042] 
Network centrality 0.318  0.246 
 [0.310; 0.328]  [0.222; 0.271] 
CS – Dyadic counterpart * Netw. centr. 0.065  0.196 
 [0.012; 0.123]  [0.084; 0.300] 
Bureaucratic quality  –0.012 0.023 
  [–0.031; 0.007] [0.002; 0.0.045] 
Income – GDP per capita (ln)  0.387 0.320 
  [0.369; 0.405] [0.297; 0.343] 
Democracy  0.202 0.195 
  [0.194; 0.210] [0.185; 0.204] 
Major power  –0.075 –0.039 
  [–0.086; –0.065] [–0.052; –0.025] 
Population (ln)  0.666 0.600 
  [0.654; 0.678] [0.584; 0.615] 
Domestic civil society leverage  –0.174 –0.192 
  [–0.194; –0.153] [–0.212; –0.172] 
Civil society years –0.611 –0.608 –0.595 
 [–0.617; –0.604] [–0.614; –0.603] [–0.601; –0.588] 
Spline 1 –0.874 0.061 –0.198 
 [–0.877; –0.870] [–0.129; 0.217] [–0.480; –0.084] 
Spline 2 –0.931 –0.669 –0.660 
 [–0.935; –0.928] [–0.673; –0.663] [–0.666; –0.654] 
Spline 3 0.176 0.352 0.357 
 [0.173; 0.180] [0.348; 0.357] [0.352; 0.363] 
Observations 253,491 239,076 171,020 
Log pseudo likelihood –114,488.29 –121,313.94 –86,102.14 
 
Notes: First difference estimates (y=1) when value of explanatory variable changes from minimum to maximum 
while holding all other variables at their median values. Estimates are based on simulations (N=1,000 of random 
draws for simulated parameters). 95% confidence interval is in brackets. Underlying robust standard errors are 
clustered on undirected dyad. 
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Table 2. Overview of survey sample 
 
Official representative from which country? Does country delegation have civil society members? 
Angola Yes 
Bangladesh Yes 
Belgium Yes 
Belgium Yes 
Bhutan Yes 
Bulgaria Yes 
Cameroon No 
Canada Yes 
China Yes 
Colombia No 
Croatia Yes 
Cyprus Yes 
Czech Republic No 
Denmark No 
Ethiopia Yes 
Germany No 
Greece No 
Grenada Yes 
Indonesia Yes 
Iraq No 
Japan Yes 
Kazakhstan Yes 
Kenya Yes 
Kiribati Yes 
Libya Yes 
Mauritania Yes 
Montenegro No 
Mozambique Yes 
Namibia Yes 
Netherlands No 
New Zealand Yes 
Norway Yes 
Pakistan Yes 
Paraguay Yes 
Peru No 
Philippines Yes 
Poland No 
Russia Yes 
Senegal No 
Somalia Yes 
Spain No 
Tajikistan No 
Tanzania Yes 
Thailand Yes 
Turkey Yes 
Tuvalu Yes 
Uganda Yes 
Ukraine Yes 
United Kingdom No 
United States of America No 
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Figure 1. Interaction effect of Network centrality and Civil society – Dyadic counterpart 
 
 
Notes: Left panel is based on Model 1. Right panel is based on Model 3. Dashed lines indicate 
95% confidence interval. Solid horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0. 
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Figure 2. Core results from survey: The importance of sovereignty and legitimacy 
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Appendix 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 of this appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics for all explanatory and control 
variables used for our analysis. The variation inflation factors (VIFs) indicate that the 
simultaneous inclusion of these variables is unproblematic from the viewpoint of potential 
multicollinearity: perhaps contrary to what one might suspect, there is not much overlap 
between, for example, democratic regimes and the bureaucratic quality of countries. 
 
Appendix table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Observations Mean SD Min Max VIF 
Civil society inclusion 354,547 0.26 0.44 0 1  
Civil society – Dyadic counterpart 341,971 0.25 0.43 0 1 1.00 
Network centrality 429,088 0.53 0.11 0.03 0.72 1.39 
Bureaucratic quality 329,882 2.19 1.15 0 4 3.27 
Income – GDP per capita (ln) 449,567 7.75 1.64 4.16 11.79 3.51 
Democracy 416,779 3.17 6.70 –10 10 1.40 
Major power 466,144 0.04 0.19 0 1 1.59 
Population (ln) 461,978 15.43 2.14 9.15 20.99 1.93 
Domestic civil society leverage 347,500 4.74 7.02 0 54 1.87 
 
Notes: Interaction term and variables for temporal correction omitted from table. 
 
Robustness checks 
The results reported in the main article are robust to a wide range of alternative model 
specifications. First, Clarke (2005) shows that the inclusion of control variables may actually 
increase the likelihood of obtaining biased estimates, rather than decreasing it. Some control 
variables we use may thus artificially reduce the observable effect of our two main 
explanatory variables and their interaction term. Model 1 in the main text does not include 
any control variables and still confirms our main results, though.  
Second, the table above suggests that the formal inclusion of representatives of civil 
society organizations in national delegations is quite rare: only 26% of our 354,547 
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observations actually see the onset of CSO participation in national delegations. Thus, we 
followed King & Zeng (2001) and corrected the intercept estimate via a rare–events logistic 
regression model. The main findings are not affected by this change of statistical procedure.  
Third, we used three–stage least squares regressions (3SLS) to investigate whether our 
results might suffer from simultaneity and selection bias. For instance, our estimates of 
Network centrality could be biased due to self–selection of countries into intergovernmental 
organizations (see, e.g., Ringquist & Kostadinova 2005). Also, states that care about 
legitimacy might be the ones that invest more in network centrality. Hence, our findings could 
be driven by an underlying commitment to legitimacy that explains both network centrality 
and the inclusion of civil society organizations but not by network centrality. For specifying 
the 3SLS, we treat Civil society inclusion and Network centrality as endogenous variables 
accordingly. While the results are very similar to those shown in Table 1 of the main text, it is 
worth noting that Network centrality still has a positive effect that is significant at the 1% 
level, but the impact of Civil society inclusion is also significant. This result supports the 
conclusion that the causal effect runs from network centrality to Civil society inclusion – and 
the other way. However, and as emphasized, our core results remain unchanged. 
Fourth, an anonymous reviewer raised the concern that the binary operationalization of our 
dependent variable might be inappropriate and suggested instead a count item capturing the 
number of civil society actors as part of state delegations. The original rationale behind the 
binary operationalization was twofold. First, the binary variable taken from Böhmelt (2013) 
does not suffer from missing values. However, the count item lacks information for some 
state delegations. Second, a dichotomous operationalization employs a somewhat 
conservative approach, which ensures that we do not overestimate the impact on the inclusion 
of civil society organizations in a delegation. That being said, we re–estimated all models 
with a count item instead, using a negative binomial regression model that follows the 
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specifications of Model 3 in Table 1 of the main text. The results from the negative binomial 
regression essentially mirror this Model 3 that employs the binary dependent variable. The 
substantive quantity of interest is summarized in the figure below.  
 
Appendix figure 1. Interaction effect of Network centrality and Civil society – Dyadic 
counterpart based on the negative binomial regression model.  
Notes: Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence interval. 
 
Finally, our approach for the interaction between Civil society – Dyadic counterpart and 
Network centrality essentially follows the logic of spatial lag models, i.e., to capture policy 
interdependencies (e.g., Franzese & Hays 2007; Cao 2010: 833; Cao & Prakash 2012: 75; 
Ward & Cao 2012). As a final robustness check, we thus estimated such a model that has the 
simplified form of: 
 
yt = Xtβ + ρWyt −1 
where yt constitutes our dependent variable, X pertains to the set of control variables and the 
constant, and Wyt-1 signifies the product of the row–standardized connectivity matrix (W) and 
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the dependent variable lagged by one year (yt-1), i.e., Wyt-1 is the spatial lag. In the words of 
Ward & Cao (2012: 1084), ‘the connectivity matrix, W, is NTxNT matrix with TNxN 
submatrices along the block diagonal, and typical element wi,j,t capturing relative connectivity 
or influence from unit j to i at time t.’ The spatial lag ‘gives a weighted average of other 
observations in the year concerned, with each weight specified by wi,j,t. The estimation of ρ 
(spatial coefficient) captures the strength of policy interdependence’. We row standardized the 
connectivity matrix so that the estimated values of ρ reflect the average influence of other 
countries’ behavior toward civil society organizations (excluding a respective country under 
study). 
However, in order to avoid simultaneity bias, we employed a lagged version of the 
dependent variable in order to calculate the spatial lag (Franzese & Hays 2007), i.e., the 
spatial lag does not give a weighted average of other observations in the year concerned, but 
in the previous year. Following our theoretical rationale, higher levels of policy 
interdependence and mutual influence regarding the inclusion of civil society organizations in 
delegations should be given for states that are more strongly connected to each other. We 
measured the degree of connectedness between two states via their co–affiliation to 
intergovernmental organizations, i.e., each element wi,j,t in the connectivity matrix is the 
number of common memberships in intergovernmental organizations shared by country i and 
country j. The data for this are taken from the same source we used for Network centrality in 
the main article, while we transformed our data set into a monadic version that has the 
country–year as the unit of analysis. We expected a positive spatial coefficient ρ and, in fact, 
the unreported estimation of a probit regression model that substitutes Civil society – Dyadic 
counterpart, Network centrality, and their interaction term for the spatial lag supports this. 
More specifically, when moving from the minimum to the maximum of Wyt-1, the probability 
of a country including civil society organizations increases by about 42%. Hence, this 
39 
 
basically mirrors our findings reported in the main text as it is suggested that countries 
strongly linked via intergovernmental organizations influence each other’s behavior towards 
civil society organizations. 
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